Analysis-US bank supervision needs more speed, transparency in wake of SVB debacle, critics say

WASHINGTON (Reuters) – The secretive world of Federal Reserve bank supervision has been laid bare by the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank and critics say it needs an overhaul to make it more nimble, transparent and decisive.

华盛顿（路透社）——美国联邦储备银行监管的秘密世界因硅谷银行的倒闭而暴露无遗，批评人士表示，它需要进行彻底改革，以使其更加灵活、透明和果断。

In hearings this week, Fed Vice Chair for Supervision Michael Barr told lawmakers that supervisors had repeatedly identified risks to the failed bank, beginning in 2021, and even took steps to restrict its growth in 2022 because they went unaddressed.

在本周的听证会上，美联储负责监管的副主席迈克尔巴尔告诉立法者，监管机构从 2021 年开始一再确定这家倒闭银行的风险，甚至采取措施限制其 2022 年的增长，因为这些风险没有得到解决。

Despite all that, SVB hit a wall earlier this month, collapsing in the space of less than 48 hours and unleashing fears of contagion. That has led to accusations by lawmakers that the Fed had not escalated the problem fast enough and questioning whether the whole process needs to be more transparent.

尽管如此，svb 本月早些时候还是碰壁了，在不到 48 小时的时间里就倒闭了，并引发了对蔓延的恐惧。这导致立法者指责美联储没有足够快地将问题升级，并质疑整个过程是否需要更加透明。

“The culture of supervision is shrouded in secrecy, I hope that SVB calls for some of that veil of secrecy to be lifted,” said Aaron Klein, a fellow with the Brookings Institution and former Treasury Department official.

“监管文化笼罩在保密之中，我希望 svb 呼吁揭开部分保密面纱，”布鲁金斯学会 (brookings institution) 研究员、前财政部官员 aaron klein 表示。

Typically, bank supervisors do most of their work behind closed doors.

通常，银行监管者的大部分工作都是闭门进行的。

“The regulators have all this secret information, some of which needs to be secret… but some of which would be made better if it were made public,” said Klein. “It‘s like saying you failed your health inspection, we’re giving you a rating of C but we dont want any of your customers to know.”

“监管机构拥有所有这些秘密信息，其中一些需要保密……但如果公开，其中一些会变得更好，”克莱因说。 “这就像说你没有通过健康检查，我们给你的评级是 c，但我们不想让你的任何客户知道。”

Supervisors flag items of concern to be addressed by banks under the notation “matters requiring attention” (MRA). If the matter is more urgent, supervisors will issue a “matter requiring immediate attention” (MRIA). Both can come with time frames in which banks are expected to resolve the matter, but do not prescribe specific solutions, and neither are public.

监管者在“需要注意的事项”（mra）的符号下标记需要银行解决的关注事项。如果事情更为紧急，主管将发布“需要立即关注的事项”(mria)。两者都可以提供银行解决问题的时间框架，但没有规定具体的解决方案，也没有公开。

If the matter is particularly concerning or persistent, supervisors can issue a “consent order,” which is a formal, public enforcement action between a regulator and a bank, which often comes with a fine and orders to address the issue in a timely fashion.

如果问题特别令人担忧或持续存在，监管机构可以发布“同意令”，这是监管机构与银行之间的正式、公开执法行动，通常会伴随罚款和及时解决问题的命令。

The Fed issued six MRAs and MRIAs in November 2021 to SVB related to liquidity, and in the fall of 2022 there was an additional MRA on interest risk modeling, Barr said.

巴尔表示，美联储于 2021 年 11 月向 svb 发布了六项与流动性相关的 mra 和 mria，并在 2022 年秋季又发布了一项关于利率风险建模的 mra。

Rep. Bill Foster, an Illinois Democrat, floated making MRAs public if not resolved within 60 days, or that bank executives would see their bonuses placed in escrow if they have unaddressed items.

伊利诺伊州民主党众议员比尔·福斯特 (bill foster) 提议，如果 60 天内未解决 mra，则公开 mra，或者如果银行高管有未解决的项目，他们的奖金将被托管。

Bank supervision is typically conducted behind closed-doors because of concerns that publicizing bank missteps could spur bank runs and undermine confidence in the overall system. It also helps banks protect trade secrets, said Julie Hill, a banking law professor with the University of Alabama School of Law.

银行监管通常是闭门进行的，因为担心公布银行的失误可能会刺激银行挤兑并破坏对整个系统的信心。它还有助于银行保护商业秘密，阿拉巴马大学法学院银行法教授朱莉希尔说。

But this process protects banks from the release of unflattering details to the public, and makes it harder to assess how well they are being supervised.

但这一过程可以保护银行免于向公众发布不讨人喜欢的细节，并使评估它们受到监管的程度变得更加困难。

“Are there ways we could make the supervisory process more transparent to promote discipline and accountability？” asked Representative Maxine Waters, the top Democrat on the House panel in Wednesdays hearing.

“我们有没有办法让监督过程更加透明，以促进纪律和问责制？”众议院小组的最高民主党代表马克辛沃特斯在周三的听证会上问道。

The Fed did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

美联储没有立即回应置评请求。

Faster escalation

更快升级

A key issue for lawmakers was whether the Fed could have escalated the problem faster to force the bank to fix its problems.

立法者面临的一个关键问题是美联储是否可以更快地升级问题以迫使银行解决问题。

Despite SVB being on the radar for regional Fed supervisors at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco for over a year, Barr said he first was made aware of interest-rate risks facing banks, and in particular SVB, at a briefing in mid-February, conceding it was a “fair question” why further action was not taken and the matter escalated.

尽管旧金山联邦储备银行的区域联储监管机构对 svb 关注了一年多，但 barr 表示，他是在 2 月中旬的一次简报会上首次意识到银行，尤其是 svb 面临的利率风险，承认这是一个“公平的问题”，为什么没有采取进一步行动并且事情升级了。

Banks are often given an expected time frame for addressing such issues, but are not prescribed fixes by supervisors. Instead, they can escalate efforts, such as placing limits on its growth, which can culminate in a public enforcement action.

通常会为银行提供解决此类问题的预期时间框架，但监管机构不会规定解决方案。相反，他们可以加大力度，例如限制其增长，最终可能会采取公共执法行动。

“It is fair to say that the Federal Reserve writ large is not particularly transparent about when items are escalated or handled by the board and the board staff,” said Hill.

“可以公平地说，美联储在董事会和董事会工作人员何时升级或处理项目方面并不是特别透明，”希尔说。

In the hearings, Barr was repeatedly pressed by lawmakers as to why supervisors did not get the bank to fix identified flaws, such as mismanaged interest rate risk and liquidity issues. Barr, who is leading an internal Fed review of its supervision of SVB, noted that supervisors can identify the issues, but it falls to the bank to fix them.

在听证会上，巴尔一再被立法者追问，为什么监管者没有让银行修复已发现的缺陷，例如管理不善的利率风险和流动性问题。巴尔正在领导美联储对其对 svb 的监管进行内部审查，他指出监管机构可以发现问题，但解决问题的责任落在银行身上。

“You are not running a consulting operation,” said Representative Brad Sherman, a California Democrat. “You are running a regulatory operation who can force banks to follow that advice.”

“你不是在经营咨询业务，”加州民主党众议员布拉德谢尔曼说。 “你正在运行一个可以迫使银行遵循该建议的监管操作。”

Some experts pointed out that the fact that Fed supervisors began chastising SVB on the lower end of the scale, issuing MRAs, suggested they did not anticipate an issue that could collapse the firm.

一些专家指出，美联储监管机构开始对 svb 进行规模较低的惩罚、发布 mra，这一事实表明他们没有预料到可能会导致公司倒闭的问题。

“The fact that it was just MRAs and not public cease and desists suggests that the regulators thought it was a problem that could be fixed by bank management in a reasonable amount of time,” said Hill.

“这只是 mra 而不是公开停止和停止的事实表明监管机构认为这是一个可以由银行管理层在合理时间内解决的问题，”希尔说。

SVBs rapid growth also was a factor for Fed supervisors. A team of 20 bank examiners at the San Francisco Federal Reserve took over day-to-day supervision of the bank in the second half of 2021. At that point more issues began to be identified.

svb 的快速增长也是美联储监管者的一个因素。 2021 年下半年，旧金山联邦储备银行由 20 名银行审查员组成的团队接管了该银行的日常监管工作。那时开始发现更多问题。

Barr said part of his review would look at whether Fed supervision was appropriate for the banks “rapid growth and vulnerabilities.”

巴尔表示，他的部分审查将考察美联储的监管是否适合银行的“快速增长和脆弱性”。

“We need competent financial supervisors. But Congress cant legislate competence,” said Representative Patrick McHenry, who chairs the House Financial Services Committee.

“我们需要有能力的金融监管者。但国会不能对权限进行立法，”众议院金融服务委员会主席、众议员帕特里克·麦克亨利 (patrick mchenry) 说。

(Reporting by Pete Schroeder; additional reporting by Ann Saphir; editing by Megan Davies and Shri Navaratnam)

（pete schroeder 报道；ann saphir 补充报道；megan davies 和 shri navaratnam 编辑）